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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

"51- I ) Sh. '

March 16, 1979 Conference
L-ist 3, Sheet 3
No. 78-1177
WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE TRIBE, et al.

Cert. to Ariz. Ct. App.
(Eubank, Jacobson, Ogg)

v.
BRACKER, et al (Ariz.
state officials)
SUMMARY:

Petitioners

State/Civil
contend

that

Timely

various

federal

statutes

preclude Arizona from collecting diesel fuel and gross receipts
taxes from non-indian logging operations performed on an indian
I

reservation under contract with an indian lumber company.
I

-

i

-

FACTS AND DECISION BELmv: Petitioners are a federally recog-

I

nized !ndian tribe and two
--L.

non- ~ ndian

companies who partic i pate

i

in a joint 7 nture named Pinetop Logginyf company.

~ ~ v~v'> 6~

--

S(:y

~~

·Under tribal

- 2 law,

the

indians

FATCO operates
which

is

ment.

a

have
lumber

the major

Under

created

lumber

operation

source of

contract

a

with

on

the

revenues

FATCO,

company
tribe's

for

Pinetop

named

the

FATCO.

reservation

tribal govern-

cuts

timber

reservation and hauls it to the sawmill by truck.

on

the

Pinetop has

no operations in Arizona except on the reservation.
Timber on indian reservations is owned by the United States
for

the

benefit of

the

indians.

FATCO's

operations

are

con-

ducted pursuant to a contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) , and the terms of Fli.TCO' s contract with Pinetop are dictated by BIA.

All of FATCO' s · operations,

formed by Pinetop,

including those per-

are subject to pervasive regulation by BIA.

BIA actually designates the trees to be cut, and fixes the speed
limits for Pinetops trucks.

BIA's authority to approve or dis-

approve Pinetop's contract with FATCO allows it to control the
price charged for Pinetop's services
The

roads

three parties:

on

the

reservation

the state,

the

result

tribe,

from

the

and Pinetop

efforts
itself.

of
The

state contributes nothing to the construction and maintenance of
roads built by the tribe or Pinetop.

In the course of its oper-

ations, Pinetop principally uses roads built by itself and the
tribe,

but it sometimes travels for

short distances over state

roads.
Arizona imposes two taxes to pay for building and maintaining highways: a tax on sales of diesel fuel, and a tax on motor

- 3 (

vehicle contract carriers calculated at 2.5% of gross receipts.
When Pinetop
1969,

the

initially contracted

to do

logging

contract price was established on the

for

FATCO

basis of

in
the

expectation that it would not be required to pay these taxes in
connection with its 0perations.

In 1971, Arizona demanded pay-

ment of the fuel and carrier taxes in connection with Pinetop's
operations,

and Pinetop and FATCO agreed that FATCO would pay

any taxes for which Pinetop ultimately was held liable.
Pinetop paid and has continued to pay the taxes under protest, and commenced this action in 2n Arizona court for a refund
and a declaration that it was immune from the fuel and carrier
taxes

by

indians.

operation

of

various

federal

statutes

relating

to

The challenge is limited to taxes allocable to opera-

tions over tribal and Pinetop roads: the company keeps accurate
records of its use of state roads and concedes the propriety of
the taxes allocable to that use.

The trial court granted sum-

mary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
First, the Court of Appeals held that the Arizona Enabling
Act,

which

in terms deprived Arizona of

jurisdiction

of

indian

reservations,

all

does

right,

not

title and

preclude

state

taxation of non-indians, even in connection with activities on
reservations.

Second, the court found that the taxes were not

barred by 25 C.F.R.

§

1.4, which exempts property belonging to

indians from all state laws regarding the regulation and devel-

c
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opment of

property.

The

levied

Pinetop's

business

on

court

explained

that

activities,

the

not

on

taxes were
the

use

of

indian property.
Third,

the court held that the taxes were not preempted by

the pervasive regulation of indian lumbering operations by BIA
and Congress.

It asserted that the federal regulations demon-

strated no concern for the prices charged by Pinetop, that there
was

no

evidence

respecting
the

the

taxes

Finally,

dismissed

intent

to

oust

activities

of

non-indians,

impede FATCO' s

to conflict

interfere with the
court

federal

commercial

would not

iously as
program.

of

with

the

petitioners

asserted

authority
and

that

lumbering business so ser-

administration of
contended

tribal government

the

state

that

the

in various

interference

as

any

federal

taxes would

ways,
"more

but

the

imaginary

than real."
CONTENTIONS: Petitioners make the following contentions:
1. This case gives this Court its first opportunity to rule
on the extent to which state taxation of lumbering operations on
indian rese%ations is preempted by federal law, and this is a
question of immense economic importance to indians.
2.

The state taxes are preempted by

regulation

of

indian

lumbering,

under

the

pervasive

Warren Trading

Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685

(1965).

federal
Post

v.

There, this

Court held that federal law preempted an Arizona transaction tax
as applied to a non-indian doing business as an indian trader on

- 5 an indian reservation.

As in this case, the Court stressed that

the trader's operations were subject to pervasive regulation .for
the

benefit of

the

indians,

and

in particular

that

the

taxes

would interfere with the policies served by federal control of
the prices charged by the trader.
3. The taxes are contrary to the Arizona Enabling Act.

The

Enabling Act imposes at least some 1 imi ts on Arizona's governmental authority with respect to reservations.

Thus, it imposes

limits

prohibits

on

state

criminal

jurisdiction,

and

state

income taxation of indians living on the reservation, McClanahan
v.

Arizona State Tax

(dictum}.

Commission,

411 U.S.

164,

175-76

(1973}

The lower court erred in disregarding the regulatory

impact of the taxes with respect to the use of indian land.
4. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4, prohibiting the application of state law
regulating
perty,

the

use and development of p"r operty

prohibits

these

taxes

development of the reservation.

because

they

to

indian pro-

interfere with

the

Other courts have held that the

regulation applies to use of tribal property even by non-indians.
5. The taxes are proh ibted under Wi 11 i ams v.
218,

220

(1959}

which prohibited states

tribal government.
of its roads,

Thus,

from

they infringe on the

Lee,

358 U.S.

interfering with
tribe's control

its managament of its timber, and its ability to

tax.
Respondents makes the following contentions:
1. The statutory and BIA regulation of forestry by indians

- 6 -

(

cannot preempt state taxation of non-indians doing business with
the

tribe.

Tribes,

Thus,

u.s.

425

cigarette

tax

Moe

463

on

v.

Confederated

{1976)

sales

by

Salish

and

Kootenai

sustained application of a Montana
an

indian business

to

non-indians.

Further, Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 16 Ariz. App. 17,
490 P. 2d 846

{1871), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial

federal question,

411

u.s.

941

{1973),

sustained

imposition of

the Arizona income tax on a non-indian attorney who derived all
Navaj~

of his income from work for the

Tribe, subject to federal

statutes and regulations governing contracts with indian tribes.
2.

The

Arizona

Emabling

Act

asserting a property interest

only

precludes

Arizona

in indian property,

from

and numerous

decisions of this Court hold that it or similar acts do not restrict

state

tions.

jurisdiction

The taxes

business

on

the

fall

over

non-indians

on

indian

reserva-

solely on non-indians who happen to do

reservation,

and

do

not

regulate

the

use

of

indian land.
3. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 only prohibits the application of traditional land use regulations to indian property.
the

regulation

is

invalid because it

In any event,

is not authorized by any

statute.
4.

The

fact

that the

burden

on

the

tribe

taxes

does

result

not

in an indirect economic

constitute

an

impermissible

infringement on tribal government.
DISCUSSION:
......._,..

The

contentions

that

taxes on ·diesel

fuel

and

- 7 contract

carriage

of the use of

by

non-indians

are

impermissible

regulations

indian property or interfere with tribal govern-

ment seem insubstantial.
There

is

some

plausibility to the argument

that the

taxes

are preempted as a result of pervasive federal regulation of all
aspects of

indian lumbering operations

in light of the general

federal policy that the reservation should be exploited for the
benefit of the indians.

Neither respondents nor the lower court

deal convincingly with Warren Trading · Post.

The question cer-

tainly has substantial practical importance.
In any event, it would seem unwise to dispose of this petition one way or another without hearing from the Solicitor General.
There is a response.
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No.

78-1604:

..

7~~~PlA--~

78-1177: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
Central

Machinery

Co.

v.

Arizona

State

Tax

~-'~vv~~~.
~
-,
----

Comm1sS10n

~.~~~~~~

~~: ~~~~dA.L-~~ ~

Questions Presented ~ ~. ·~

h.-;~~~~~

~l- ~

1. Does federal regulation of

~'1 u~ufEf').(·~Pt-,
~k- ~ -~ fC~

Mountain) and Indian trading (Central
taxes

that

fall

on

certain

activities within an
these

cases

Mac~ e~o ~

who engage in those
~.
Indian reservation?
In other words, are

controlled

non-Indians

by Warren Trading

State Tax Commission, 380

u.s.

Post Co.

v.

Arizona

685 (1965)?

2. Do the Arizona taxes on non-Indians who do business
with

the

government?

Indians

impermissibly

interfer

with

tribal

self-

Facts

These

straight-lined

cases

raise

the

same

issues, but they involve altogether different facts.
briefs

state the

facts

rather well,

--

works

as

an

summary will

try to

~ t9-jt .)

Petr Pinetop Logging Co.
It

Since the

I

draw some opinionated conclusions.

I. White Mountain {

this

legal

independent

is a / non-Indian enterprise.

contractor

for

FATCO,

the

Indian

corporation that manages the lumbering interests of petr White
Mountain Apache Tribe.
including

its

The entire Indian 1 umbering operation,

contract with Pinetop,

and supervised by the BIA.
them,

----------------~

is extensively regulated

Pinetop's job is to fell trees, cut

and deliver them to FATCO's sawmills.

An essential and

expensive part of that job is the construction of roads through
the

forests

on

the

reservation.

These

logging

roads

are

constructed and maintained at the expense of Pinetop and FATCO
without any help from the state.

Pinetop also uses state roads

within the reservation during the course of its operations, but
taxes allocable to such use are not disputed.
Arizona has levied two road use taxes against Pinetop.
The first is called a<.motor
contract
receipts.

motor

carriers

of

c~x."
property

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§

at

40-641

2. 5%

of

It taxes all
their

(1979 Supp.).

gross

The tax

is conceived as a tax on the privilege of engaging in a business
that makes inordinate use of public highways, see cases cited at
Petr's Brief 13, and all revenues are ear-marked for maintenance
and improvement of the state's highways.
§

40-641(C).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

The second tax is called N

uel use excise tax."

It levies an $.08 per gallon exaction on all fuel used to propel
a motor vehicle over a public highway within the state.
28-1551 (4).

The

levy

is

"for

the

purpose

of

compensating the state for the use of its highways."
1552.
logging

Under

state

law

(and

roads within the

perhaps

BIA

reservation are

"public."

indemnify

to

1 iabil i ty,

but

that

Pinetop

contractual

analysis of the case.

for

this

Id.

§

Thus,

28the
the

The tribe has

unanticipated

undertaking

~

partially

regulations),

state holds Pinetop responsible for both taxes.
agreed

Id.

should not

tax

affect

The legal incidence of the tax is still

on non-Indians, and the Indians probably would bear the economic
incidence in any case.

II. Central Machinery (
Appl

~ o1

Il

~ ~~)

Central Machinery Co.

is

a

non-Indian,

Arizona

corporation with a single place of business off the reservation.
It is not a federally licensed Indian trader.

In 1973, Central

Machinery went onto the Gila River Indian Reservation and sold
eleven farm tractors to a tribal farming enterprise called Gila
River Farms.

Contract, delivery,

and payment were made within

the reservation.

The transaction was supervised and approved by

local BIA officials.
Arizona levies what it calls a
"transaction privilege tax" on persons doing business within the
state.

Ariz.

Rev.

Stat. Ann.

42-1309.

§

retailers of tangible property an

The tax exacts from

amount equal

to

2% of "the

gross proceeds of sales or gross income from the business."
§

42-1312(A).

In

this

case,

the

gross

receipts

tax

Id.

on

the

tractor sale ($2,916.62) appeared as a separate item on the bill
that

Central

Machinery

gave

to

Gila

River

Farms.

An

early

Interior Dep't opinion on the application of the tax to Indians
also

notes

that,

at

that

time,

purchasers

used

token

representing one mil to reimburse sellers for the Arizona gross
receipts
Brief

tax due on

27-28.

sales.

The

57

statutes

I.D.

124,

themselves,

indication that this is a "sales" tax.

discussed at Appe's
however,

contain

no

And this Court's opinion

in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S.
685

(1965),

treats

the

tax

as

if

it were

a

tax on business.

Accord, Arizona State Tax Commission v. Garrett Corp., 291 P.2d
208

(Ariz.

Kenworth,

1955);
Inc.,

Arizona

561

State

P.2d 757

Tax

(Ariz.

Commission

App.

1977).

v.
Cf.

Southwest
Complete

Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); General Motors
Corp.
of

v. Washington,

Revenue,

340

U.S.

377 U.S.
534

436

(1951)

(1964); Norton v. Department
(all

involving

receipt or privilege taxes on interstate business).

state

gross

Gila

River

Farms

paid

the

tax

item

on

Central

Machinery's bill under protest, and Central agreed to remit any
recovery

in

this

suit

to

Gila.

Nevertheless,

the

legal

incidence of the tax is on the non-Indian seller.

Whether or

not Arizona sellers routinely

an

identify the

tax

as

item on

their bills, the economic incidence of the tax probably is on
buyers.

Discussion

In both cases, non-Indians claimed that Arizona could
not

tax

their

business

rejected both claims.
Commission,

Indians.

The

Arizona

Warren Trading Post Co.

u.s.

380

with

685

(1965)

v.

courts

Arizona Tax

(hereinafter Warren),

is

the

most relevant precedent.

It involved the very tax at issue in

Central

White

Machinery.

Machinery,
White

is

the

But
case

to

Mountain,

which

rather

Warren most

Mountain should be reversed;

than

easily

Central
applies.

Central Machinery probably

should be affirmed.

I. White Mountain
The taxpayer in Warren was a federally licensed Indian
trader who kept store within a reservation.
the

pervasive

federal

regulations

Indians preempted the Arizona gross

The Court held that

governing
receipts

trading
tax

with

the

assessed

for

the

privilege

apparently

doing

business

all-inclusive

authorizing

them,"

sufficient
Indian

of

to

the

show

said,

Congress

trading on reservations

remains

for

traders."

state

laws

u.s.

380

the

regulations

Court

that

within

statutes

in

themselves

the

in hand

additional

"[S] ince federal

"These

the

seem

taken

so fully

imposing

at 690.

and

"would
had

state.

business

of

that no room
burdens

upon

legislation has

left the State with no duties or responsibilities respecting the
reservation
that

Indians,"

Congress

the Court

intended

levying this tax."
Warren

to

continued,

leave

the

"we

State

cannot believe

the

privilege

of

Id. at 691.
seems

rather

-

to

clearly

call

for

the

invalidation of the contract carrier and fuel taxes imposed on

~

~~

Pinetop.
are

(1)

-

The federal regulations governing Indian lumbering

just as pervasive as

(arguably, more

~~~ regulations

governing

~
r ie ~

(an exc-:llent review of the

~

~

Indian timber).
conducted
taxable

trading

with

the

pervasive

See

Indians.
federal

than)

the

Petr's

regulation of

( 2) Pinetop's allegedly taxable activities are

entirely within
activities

occur

the

reservation.

entirely

on

(3)

roads

maintained by the Indians or their contractors.

The

allegedly

constructed

and

Since the state

has no responsibility and incurs no expense for these roads, it
cannot have
upon them.

the

privilege of taxing

Indian-related

activities

~~j}~
The

last

point,

which

builds

upon

the

last-quoted

language from Warren, suggests a supportive argument that none
A fundamental due process limitation

of the parties mentions.

---

upon a state's taxing jurisdiction is the notion that the state
must have given the taxpayer some benefit for which the tax can
ask return.
State Tax
J.C.

See, e.g. , Norfolk & Western Ry.
Commission,

Penney

invoke

Co.,

this

390 U.S.

311

U.S.

principle

apportionment

of

state

435,

when

325

444

they

taxes on

seems apt in the present case.
with the

317,

Wisconsin v.

Courts

asked

interstate

to

usually

review

business.

But

the
it

Since Arizona has nothing to do

logging roads at issue here,

its road use taxes ask
The counter argument, of

return for a benefit never afforded.
course,

(1968);

(1940).

are

Co. v. Missouri

is that the logging roads might have limited value if

they did not connect to state highways.

That may or may not be

true on the facts.

II. Central Machinery
The taxpayer in Warren was trading with the Indians,
and

he

was

Machinery.

asked

to

pay

the

very

now levied on Central

But there the similarity between Warren and Central

Machinery ends.

(1)

Central Machinery is not in "the business

of Indian trading on reservations."
(emphasis

tax

added).

It

has

no

regulations do not govern the way

See Warren, 380 U.S. at 690
federal
in which

license.

Federal

it does business.

J

(2) The transaction at issue here required no federal license.
It was

not

subject to pervasive

federal

-~

regulation.

All

transaction required was the approval of the local BIA agents.
That

approval

probably was directed more to the purchase--the

expenditure of tribal resources--than to

the

In

sale.

short,

Central Machinery simply engaged in a one-time sale to certain
----'--

Indians.
should

That its customers themselves are heavily regulation

make

no

difference.

Nor

should

it matter

that

those

customers are willing to transfer their tax immunity to Central
Machinery

by

protesting

a

tax-based

portion

of

the

costs of

doing business that were included in the sale price.
The Indians probably had jurisdiction to tax Central
Machinery

for

the

privilege

of

making

a

sale

within

the

reservation.

This case might come out differently had they done

so,

something more

although

Washington

v.

Reservation,
result.

Confederated

No.

But

7 8-630,

the

obvious

than

the

Tribes

would

be

business

forthcoming
of

the

necessary

dec is ion

Colvill~

to

Indian

support

considerations

in

that

that
now

counsel the Indians not to tax those who trade with them would
disappear if this Court held that sellers who make BIA-approved
sales are immune from otherwise applicable state business taxes.
Since

the

preemption

analysis

in

Warren

does

not

require reversal in this case, the Court must turn to the appl's
argument

that

government.

the

state

tax

interfers

with

tribal

self-

Appl's rather truncated argument on this point has

9.

-"

two

themes,

that

a

tax

both of which are unpersuasive.
raising

the

price

Indians' farming operation.

of

farm

( 1 ) Ar;>pl

equipment

is

obvious.

burdens

the

Since the reservation was set aside

for the very purpose of supporting Indian farming,
the tax

argues

inconsistent with federal pol icy.

it continue,

The response

is

The business tax at issue here is simply one of the
It raises the price to the

A~

1rv

Indian

no

more

directly

-----------

than

seller's total enterprise.
immunize

Indians

from

any

other

tax

levied

on

the

Federal policy is not designed to

normal

business

costs.

(2)

Appl

also

argues that the state tax directly interfers with tribal selfgovernment

because

it

taxes

Indians

and

because

it

conflict with any tax that the tribe itself might levy.
argument is partly answered in the previous paragraph.
of

the

argument

has

no

merit

because

there

is

would
This

The rest
no

clear

indication either in Warren or in the briefs now filed that the
challenged tax

is a sales tax on the buyer.

falls on the seller.

Rather,

the tax

The forthcoming decision in Confederated

Tribes, supra, makes clear that state taxes are not invalid iust
because

its economic

incidence

is on Indians.

Instead,

state

taxes are invalid when they (1) reduce the revenues of the tribe
itself, (2) place Indian business at a competitive disadvantage,
and

(3)

inject

state

law

into

a

transaction

within

the

reservation that the Indians have chosen to subject to their own
laws.

See

Third

Draft of Confederated Tribes at

19-20.

The

second

two

factors

are

the

most

important,

and

neither

is

present in this case.

Summary

Warren Trading Post held that

the pervasive

federal

regulations governing trading with the Indians on a reservation
preempted

the

gross

receipts

tax

that

Arizona was

trying

to

assess against an on-reservation Indian trader for the privilege
of doing business within the state.

Warren should control the

decision in both of these cases.

1. White Mountain: Arizona cannot levy road use taxes
on petr Pinetop's activity because:

(a) the federal regulations

of Indian logging with which petr Pinetop must comply are just
as pervasive as (arguably, more pervasive than) the regulations
in Warren;

(b)

the state seeks to tax Pinetop for activities

conducted entirely within the reservation and upon Indian roads
for which the state has no responsibility.

2.
privilege
because:
federal

Central

(gross
(a)

Machinery:

receipts)

tax

Arizona
on

Reverse.

can

appl

levy

Central

a

business
Machinery

Central Machinery is not subject to the system of

regulation involved

in Warren since it is not "in the

business of Indian trading on reservations," Warren, 380 U.S. at

690;

(b)

the transaction from which the tax arises was a one-

time sale not subject to pervasive federal regulation; (c) a tax
that falls on the non-Indian seller and does no more than raise
his selling price by increasing his costs of business does not
interfer with tribal self-government.

Affirm.
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JUSTICE

w .. .

March 20, 1980

J . BRENNAN, JR .

'·'

RE:

No. 78-1177

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

·.

.I
l .
I

!. '
I

<!J:ottrl of tlrt ~ttittlt .:§faft.9'
~M'~fott, ~. <!J. Z.Oc?)!..:J

~ttprtmt

CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 20, 1980

Re:

78-1177 -White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker

1,,.;·

Dear Thurgood:
In due course I will circulate a dissent.
Respectfully,

,.
'·

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

GM:3-20-80
No. 78-1177: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker

Mr. Justice,

Mr. Justice Marshall now has circulated the majority
opinion in this companion to Central Machinery Co. v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm'n, No. 78-1604.

You are in the majority in this case,

but not in Central Machinery.

Mr. Justice Stewart has written

that he will write a dissent in Central Machinery; he probably
will write the dissent in this case as well.

This is a much better opinion than the one circulated in
Central Machinery.

It is well put together, well-written, and

sets forth a good summary of the Indian preemption cases.

Still,

the draft seems simply to throw up its hands and says that
decisions in this area must be ad hoc.

And the reasons it

advances to show that these state taxes would interfere with
federal regulation of Indian lumbering do not immediately strike
one as overwhelming.

Since--as I suggested in my 15 Mar. note on Central
Machinery--you probably will need to write a short opinion
explaining why you distinguish these two Indian tax cases, I
recommend you write to Mr. Justice Marshall that (a) you presently
intend to vote with the maiority in this case only, but (b) you

2.

will not decide whether to join his opinion until you have
considered what--if anything--you yourself should write to explain
your unique view of the two cases.

Greg

.'•

',.

···,"

;

March 20, 1980

78-1177 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
'•.l'

Dear Thurgooo:
I voted with the maiority in this case, and think:
you have written a fine opinion. In Central Machinery, I was
in dissent - the only Justice to be for the Indians in one
and aqainst them in the other.
I therefore probably will write explaininq why I
view these cases differently. Althouqh my present intention
is to join you in this case, I will await other writing incluoing the dissent in Central Machinery - before decidinq
finally whether to join your opinion.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall •
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference "
'

.
't

H

'l~

:'!).

-~·

:!1'

•,,

~ttp"rtlttt "Jonrf

Gf tqt ~ttit:t~ ~htftg

'~hts!pn.gtcn. ~.

QJ.

211.?>!~

CHAMBE:RS 01'"

March 24, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

.-

.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

March

780

No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker

Dear Thurgood,
I have read your proposed opinion and agree with a good
deal of it.
Part III is the dispositive section, and I agree with
its analysis and result. My sole concern is the implication
of your statement on page 14 that "it is undisputed that the
economic burden of these taxes will ultimately fall on the
Tribe." In Confederated Tribes, the Court will uphold a
State tax on non-Indians even though the economic burden of
which falls on the Tribe. Could this statement be omitted
or rephrased?
I have some difficulties with Part II and in light of
Part III, wonder about its necessity. As you note, generalizations in Indian law are treacherous.
I am concerned that
some of the broader statements in Part II, taken out of context, might be applied in an inappropriate way in future
cases. For example, at page 7 you quote Br~an v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), for the propos~t~on that "Indians
stand in a special relation to the Federal Government from
which the States are excluded unless Congress has manifested
a clear purpose to • . • allow States to treat Indians as
part of the genera l community." This statement was unexceptionable in Bryan, where the question was whether Pub. L.
280 permitted the States to tax Indian property which was
clearly exempt from taxation under Moe and McClanahan.
It
makes sense in this context to say that State taxat~on is
excluded unless Congress has permitted it. But it is questionable whether the same rule applies in cases involving
State taxation of non-Indians doing business on the reservation.
Indeed, Moe seems to the contrary, since the State
was there permitced to tax non-Indian purchasers from Indianoperated reservation smoke shops despite the absence of
federal statutes clearly intended to allow State taxation.

-2-

Similarly, you state at page 7 that the Court has
"re j ected the proposition that in order to find a particular
state law to have been pre-empted by operation of federal
law, an express congressional statement to that effec t is
required." This is certainly true in some cases, suc h as
cases involving only Indians or case s involving relations
between non-Indians and Indians on the reservatio n. It is
not true, however, in cases involving relations between nonIndians and Indians off the reservation . Rather , "[a]bsent
express federal law to the contrary , Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries have generally been held sub j ect to
nondiscriminatory state law • . • • " Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 148-149 (1973 ).
At page 8 you cite Moe for the proposition tha t
"' automatic exemptions as a matter of constitutiona l law' are
unusual." At least the clear implication in Moe was that
automatic exemptions of this type are not recognized at all.
Finally, you say at page 8 that in the case of nonIndians conducting activities on the reservation , the preemption inquiry is "designed to determine whether , in th e
specific context , the exercise of state authority would
undermine some federal policy ."
While I agree that federa l
policies are relevant , this statement might suggest an inquiry int o the broad policies of encouraging Indian sel fgovernment and strengthening reservation economies without
due attention to the specific language and provisions of the
relevant statutes .

,....

Sincerely yours,

!/I
,·;l

/1~
Mr.Justice Marshal l
Copi es to the Conference
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CHAMBERS 01"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 28, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1177 -White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker

Dear Byron:
Thank you for your comments on my proposed op1n1on
in this case. I think that I can accommodate almost
all of your concerns.
With respect to the statement on p. 14, you are of
course correct in suggesting that the fact that the
economic burden falls on the Tribe is not
dispositive. It is, however, relevant, as Warren
Trading Post makes clear. My reference to the
economic burden was intended to be read in
conjunction with the immediately following sentence,
which demonstrates that it is not the economic burden
itself, but the Federal regulatory scheme in general,
that leads to the result we reach. Would your concern
be met if I added a footnote stating explicitly that
the incidence of the economic burden is not
controlling and distinguishing Moe and/or
Confederated Tribes?
I do believe that Part II is necessary in order to
set up a framework with which to approach the case.
However, I am willing to adopt in full three of your
four suggestions by (1) deleting the quotation from
Bryan on p. 7; (2) adding a footnote on p. 7 to quote
the statement in Mescalero with respect to Indians
going beyond reservation boundaries; and (3) altering
the sentence immediately before Part III to conclude,
"whether, in the specific context, the exercise of
state authority would violate federal law."

.:§npumc Qf!lttrl (lf tlp~ 1iUriftb .;§htlt.l:l

2.1Iattlyi:ttgton. ~. <!J. 20,?>t~
CHAM BE R S OF

March 31, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

I
Re:

No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker

Dear Thurgood,
Thank you for your letter of March
28. Your suggested changes for the most
part satisfy me and I join your opinion.
Although I would have preferred that you
eliminate the word '' a utomatic" from the
stat e ment in footnote 18, I shall leave
the matter in your hands.
Sincerely yours,
//}

~~
Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

- 2 -

I do not agree that the statement in footnote 18
in Moe--referring to "automatic exemptions as a
inat'£"er of constitutional law"--should be read as
broadly as you suggest. Certainly the language of the
footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a number
of our cases recognize the principle that the
exercise of state authority over the reservation may
be impermissible, not because it is "preempted" in
the ordinary sense, but because it infringes on
tribal self-government. See Williams v. Lee and the
cases cited on p. 6 on my proposed opinion. This
principle, I think, is difficult to reconcile with
the view that "automatic" or "constitutional"
exemptions are not recognized at all.
Sincerely,

c;tftl .
•

T.M.

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

le: The
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[March -, 1980]
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are once again called upon to consider the
extent of Rtate authority over the activities of non-Indians
engaged in commerce on an Indian reservation. The State
of Arizona sePks to apply its motor carrier license and use fuel
taxes to petitioner Pinetop Logging Company (Pinetop), an
enterprise consisting of two non-Indian corporations authorized to do business in Arizona and operating solely on the Fort
Apache Reservation. Pinetop and petitioner White Mountain Apache Tribe contend that the taxes are pre-empted by
federal law or, alternatively, that they represent an unlawful
infriugement on tribal self-government. The Arizona Court
of Appeals rejected petitioners' claims. We hold that the
taxes are pre-empted by federal law, and we therefore reverse.

I
The 6,500 members of petitioner White Mountain Apache
Tribe reside on the Fort Apache Reservation in a mountainous and forested region of northeastern Arizona. 1 The
1 The Fort Apache Reservation was originally established as the White
Mountain Reservation by an Executive Order ~ignecl by Pr~iclent Grant
on Novemb<>r , 1871. Dy tlw Act of Congre~s of .June 7, lR9i, 30 Stat.
64, the White Mountain Reservation was divided into the Fort Apache
and San Carlos Reservations.
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Tribe is organized under a constitution approved by the Secre..
tary of the Interior under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25
U. S. C. § 476. The revenue used to fund the Tribe's governmental programs is derived almost exclusively from tribal
enterprises. Of these enterprises, timber operations have
proved by far the most important, accounting for over 90%
of the Tribe's total annual profits. 2
The Fort Apache Reservation occupies over 1,650,000 acres,
including 720,000 acres of commercial forest. Approximately
300,000 acres are used for the harvesting of timber on a
"sustained yield" basis, permitting each area to be cut
every 20 years without endangering the forest's continuing
productivity. Under federal law, timber on reservation land
is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and
cannot be harvested for sale without the consent of Congress.
Acting under the authority of 25 CFR § 141.6 and the tribal
constitution, and with the specific approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, the Tribe in 1964 organized the Fort Apache
Timber Company (FATCO), a tribal enterprise that man~
ages, harvests, processes, and sells timber. F ATCO, which
eonducts all of its activities on the reservation, was created
with the aid of federal funds. It employs about 300 tribal
members.
The United States has entered into contracts with FATCO,
authorizing it to harvest timber pursuant to regulations of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. FATCO has itself contracted
with six logging companies, including Pinetop, which perform
certain operations that F ATCO could not carry out as economically on its own. 3 Since it first entered into agreements
with FATCO in 1969, Pinetop has been required to fell trees,
eut them to the correct size, and transport them to F ATCO's
sawmill in return for a contractually specified fee. Pinetop
2 In
1973, for example, tribal enterprises showed a net profit of
$1 ,667,091, $1,508,713 of which was attributable to timber operations.
3 FATCO initially attempted to perform t~ome of its own logging and
h~uling o,pe:ration:s but found itself 1.\nable to do these tvsks ecOiwmiciilly,

78-1177-0PINION
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employs approximately 50 tribal members. Its activities,
performed solely on the Fort Apache Reservation, are subject
to extensive federal control.
In 1971 respondents 4 sought to impose on Pinetop the two
state taxes at issue here. The first, a motor carrier license
tax, is assessed on " [e] very common motor carrier of property
and every contract motor carrier of property." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 40-641 (A) (1). Pinetop is a "contract motor
carrier of property" since it is engaged in "the transportation
by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any
public highway." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-601 (A) (7) . The
motor carrier license tax amounts to 2.5 % of the carrier's
gross receipts. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40--641 (A) (I). The
second tax at issue is an excise or use fuel tax designed " [ f] or
the purpose of partially compensating the state for the use
of its highways." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1552. The tax
amounts to eight cents per gallon of diesel fuel used "in the
propulsion of a motor vehicle on any highway within this
State." lb'id. The use fuel tax was assessed on Pinetop
because it uses diesel fuel to propel its vehicles on the state
highways within the Fort Apache Reservation.
Pinetop paid the taxes under protest,G and then brougU
suit in state court, asserting that under federal law the taxes
could not lawfully be imposed on logging activities conducted
exclusively within the reservation or on hauling activities on
Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal roads. 0 The Tribe agreed
Respondents are the Arizona Highway Department, the Arizona Highway Commission, and individual members of each entity.
5 Between November 1971 and May 1976 Pinetop paid under protest
$19,114.59 in use fuel taxf's and $14,701.42 iu motor carrier J icPn~f' taxes .
Since that time it has continued to pay taxes pending the outcomE> of this
case. Refund litigation is pending in state court with rPspPct to the five
other non-Indian contractors Pmployed by the Tribe, and that litigation
has been stayed pending tlw outcome of this suit.
6 For purposes of this action petitioners have concedPd Pinetop's liability
for both motor carrier license and use fuel taxes att ributable to travel on
state Il~hways within tfl:e l!esel:vatm. Pinet@]?· I1as maintained record>
4
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to reimburse Pinetop for any tax liability incurred as a result
of its on-reservation business :11ctivities, and the Tribe intervened in the action as a plaintiff. 7
Both petitioners and respondents moved for summary judgment on the issue of the applicability of the two taxes to
Pinetop. Petitioners submitted supporting affidavits from
the manager of F ATCO, the head forester of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and the Chairman of the White Mountain
Apache Tribal Council; respondents offered no affidavits disputing the factual assertions. by petitioners' affiants. ·The
trial court awarded summary judgment to respondents, 8 and
the petitioners appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' pre-emption claim.
585 P. 2d 891 (1978). Purporting to apply the test set forth
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. lv'elson, 350 U. S. 497
( 1956), the court held that the taxes did not conflict with
federal regulation of tribal timber, that the federal interest
was not so dominant as to preclude assessment of the challenged state taxes, and that the federal regulatory scheme did
not "occupy the field." "The court also concluded that the
state taxes would not unlawfully infringe on tribal selfgovernment. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari.
-u.s.- (1980).
of fuel attributable to tra.vel on those highways, and computations would
evidently be made in order to allocate a portion of the gro~s receipts taxable under the motor carrier license tax to state highways.
7 When Pinetop contracted to undertake timber opera tious for F ATCO
in 1969, both Pinetop and FATCO believed that it would not be required
to pay state taxes. After re~pondents assessed the taxes at issue, FATCO
agreed to pay them to avoid the lo~s of Pinetop's services
8 After the trial court entered summary judgment on the issue of tl1e
applicabihty of the state taxes, the case procPeded to tnal on the stateJaw issue of the manner of ca.leulating the motor vehicle license tax. FinaT
judgment was entered for respondents on all 1ssues after trw!. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Superior Court on thecalcu.latiQn of the motor vehicle licen~e tax. 585 P. 2d 891, 900 (1978).
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II
Although "[g] eneralizations on this subject have be.:
come ... treacherous," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U. S. 145, 148 ( 1973), our decisions establish several basic
principles with respect to the boundaries between State regu..:
Iatory authority and tribal self-government. Long ago the
Court departed from Mr·. Chief Justice Marshall's view that
"the laws of [a State] can have no force" within reservation
boundaries, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832) .9·
See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai 1'ribes, 425 U. S. 463, 481-483~
(1976); New York ex ret. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496.
(1946); Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885).
At the same time we have recognized that the Indian tribes
retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313;
323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49,
55-56 ( 1978). As a result, there is no rigid rule by which to'
resolve the question whether a particular state law may be·
applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members. The
status of the tribes has been described as "an anomalous one
and of complex character," for despite their partial assimilation into American culture, the tribes have retained "a semiindependent position ... not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the la.ws of
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided."
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U . S. 164, 174
(1973), quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381382 (1886) .
9 The shift in approach is discussed in Williams v Lee, 358 U. S. 217,
219 (1959); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71- 75
(1962); and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comrnissiou, 411 :u. S.
164, 172 '(1973) .

18-1177-0PINION
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Congress has broad power to regulate tribal a.ffairs under
the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See United
States v. Wheeler, supra, 435 U. S., at 322-323. This congressional authority and the "semi-independent position" of
Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related
barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over
tribal reservations and members. First, , the exercise of such
authority may be pre-empted by federal law. See, e. g.,
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380
U.S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
supra. Second, it may unlawfully infringe "on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1958). See also
Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, U. S. - , (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971) .
The two barriers are independent because either, standing
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal
members. They are related, however, in two important ways.
The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent
on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so. tr:aditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply
engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an
important " backdrop," McClanahan v. Arizona State· Tax
Comm' n, supra, 411 U. S., at 172, against which vague or
ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it
generally unhelpful to ar>ply to federal enactments regulating
Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have
emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are
not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their
sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of
pre-emption that are properly applied to the other. The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal
members must inform the determination wheth€r the exercise
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of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal
law. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425 U. S., at
475. As we have repeatedly recognized, this tradition is reflected and encouraged in a number of congressional enac~
ments demonstrating a firm fe~eral policy of promoting tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development. 10 Ambiguities in
federal law have been construed generously in order to com.;
port with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with
the federal policy of en~ouraging tribal independence. See
McClanahan v. Arizona State 1'a:r Cornrn'n, supra, 411 U. S.,
at 174-175. and 11. 13. \Ve have thus rejected thP proposition
that in order to find a particular state law to have been pre-:
empted by operation of federal law. all express congressional
statement to that effect is required.' 1 Warren Trading Post
do. v. Arizona State Ta;r Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965). At
the same time any applicable regulatory interest of the State
must be given weight, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax

°For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451
et seq., ;;tates: "It i;; hereby declared to be the policy of Congres:; . . .
to help develop and utilize Indian resource:;, both physical and human, to
a point where the Indian::; will fully exercise re~ponsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a
standard of living from their own productive efforts com11arable to that
enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities." Similar policies
underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assi;;tunce Act, 25
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
25 U. S. C. 461 et seq., whose "intent and purpose ... was 'to rehabilitate
the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a. century of oppression and paternalism.' " M escalem
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), quoting H. R. Rep.
No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Ses:;., 6 (1934). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1979) . Cf. Gros:>, Indian Self-Determmation and
Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Policy, 56 Tex. L. Rev.
11\)5 (1978).
n In the ca::;r of "Indian!'; going bryond :,;tatr boundarie:-;,'' howrver,
"a nondi::;criminatory state law '' i,.; genrrally applicable in tlw nb:;('JH'r of
"pxprr:ss fPderal law to thP contrary.'' Mescalem Apache 1'ribl' v Jones,
411
14.~, 148-149.
1

u. .
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Comm'-n, supra, 411 U. R., a.t 171, and "automatic exemptions
'as a matter of constitutional law' " arc unusual. Moe v.
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, suprn, 425 U. R.. at 481. n. 18.
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest
in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. See
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425 U. S., at 480~
481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra.
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts
authority over the conduct of non- fnclians engaging in activity on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the
language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms
of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions
(Jf sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions
of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on
mechanical or absolute conceptions of State or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the
nature of the State, Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law. ,
Compare Warren 1'rading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, supra, and Williams v. Lee, supra.. " ·ith Moe v.
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, and Thomas v. Gay, 169
U. S. 264 (1898). Cf. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, supra, 411 U.S., at 171; Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, trnpra, 411 U . S., at 148.

•'

III
With these principles in mind, we turn to the respondents'
claim that they may, consistent with federal law, impose the
contested motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes on the
logging and hauling operations of petitioner Pinetop. At the
eutset we observe that the Federal Government's regulation of.
the h:arvestin_g of Indian timber is comp1·ehensive. ..That reg~

.

,.

.,
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ulation takes the form of Acts of Congress, detailed regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, and dayto-day supervision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Under
25 U.S. C. ~§ 405-407, the Secretary of the Interior is granted
broad authority over the sale of timber on the reservation.J 2
Timber on Indian land may be sold only with the consent of
the Secretary, and the proceeds from any such sales, less
administrative expenses incurred by the Federal Government,
are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or transferred to
the Indian owner. Sales of timber must "be based upon a
consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406. The statute specifies
the factors which the Secretary must consider in making that
determination. 13 In order to assure the continued produc1 2 Frd<>ral policir,; with rr~prct. to tribal timlwr hav<' a long history.
In United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874), and Pine River Logging &
Improvement Co. v. United States, 186 U . S. 279 (1902) , the Court held
that tribal mrmbers had no right to ~I'll timber ou reservation land unless
the sale wa~; related to the improvement of the laud . At the same time
the Court interpreted the governing statute as designed "to permit deserving Indian~. who had no other sufficient mean:> of o;upport, to cut . . .
a limited quantit~r of . . . timber . . . and to usr the proceeds for their
support . .. , provided that 10 percent of thr gross proceedo; should go
to the stumpage or poor fund of the tribe from which the old, sick, and
otherwisr helples~ might be ;;upported." /d., at 285-286.
The Attorney Grnrral interprE:>ted the holding in Cook to mean that
Indians had no right to re,;ervation timber. S!'r 19 Op . Atty. G<.>n. 194
(1888). This intrrpreta.tion was overturned by Congi'e&"> by Act of
June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 36 Stat . 855, as amended, 25 U . S. C. § 407, and
also repudiated in United States v. Shoshone Indians, 304 U . S. 111 (1938).
Thus, as the Court summarized in United States v. Algoma Lumber Co .,
305 U. S. 415 ( 1939), "under .. . established principle:> applicable to
land reservations created for the benefit of the Indian tribes, the Indians
are beneficial owners of the land and the timber standing upon it and of
the proreeds of their sale, subject to the plenary 11ower of control by the
United Statr:::, to br rxrrcisrd for the bPneJH and protrction of thr Indians."
See 25 U . S. C . § 196; United States v. M itchell, - U . S. (19k0) .
1 ~1 Thoi'lr fartor~ inrln<lr " (1) the :-;tate of growth of t hP timbrr :mel
the need for maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the bene-
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tivity of timber-producing land on tribal reservations, timber
on unaJlotted lands "may be sold in accordance with the
principles of sustained yield." 25 U. S. C. § 407. The Secretary is granted power to determine the disposition of the
proceeds from timber sales. He is authorized lio promulgate
· regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry unitS. 25 U.S. C. §'466.
Acting pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has promul. ·gated a detailed set of regulations to govern the harvesting
and sale of tribal timber. Among the stated objectives of the
regulations is the "development of Indian forests by the
Indian people for the purpose of promoting self-sustaining
communities, lio the end that the Indians may receive from
their own property not only the stumpage value, but also the
benefit of whatever profit it is capable of yielding and what.
ever labor the Indians are qualified to perform." 25 CFR
§ 141.3 (a)(3) . The regulations cover a wide variety of
matters: for example, they restrict clear-cutting, § 141.5;
establish comprehensive guidelines for the sale of timber,
§ 141.7; regulate the advertising of timber sales, §§ 141.8141.9; specify the manner in which bids may be accepted and
rejected, § 141.11; describe the circumstances in which con.
tracts may be entered into, §§ 141.12-141.13; require the
approval of all contracts by the Secretary, § 141.13; call fol'
timber cutting permits to be approved by the Secretary,
· § 141.19; specify fire protective measures, § 141.21; and pro..
vide a board of administrative appeals, § 141.23. Tribes are
expressly authorized lio establish commercial enterprises for
the harvesting and logging of tribal timber. § 141.6.
Under these regulations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
·exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and
ftt of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and the be:>t u::;e of the land,
including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other u~;e::; for
the benefit of the owner and his heirs, and (3) the pre~:>ent and future
financlai needi of the owner and his heirs," 25 lJ. S. C. § 406.
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management of tribal timber. In the present case, contracts
between F ATCO and Pinetop must be approved by the
Bureau; indeed, the record shows that some of those contracts
were drafted by employees of the Federal Government.
Bureau employees regulate the cutting, hauling, and marking
of timber by FATCO and Pinetop. The Bureau decides such
matters as how much timber will be cut, which trees will be
felled , which roads are to be used, which hauling equipment
Pinetop should employ, the speeds at which logging equipment may travel, and the width, length, height, and weight
of loads.
The Secretary has also promulgated detailed regulations
governing the roads developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 CFR Part 162. BIA roads are open to "lfJree public use." § 162.8. Their administration and maintenance are
funded by the Federal Government, with contributions from
the Indian tribes. §§ 162.6-162.6a. On the Fort Apache
Reservation the Forestry Department of the Bureau has required F ATCO and its contractors, including Pinetop, to
repair and maintain existing BIA and tribal roads and in some
cases to construct new logging roads. Substantial sums have
been spent for these purposes. In its federally approved contract with F ATCO, Pinetop has agreed to construct new roads
and to repair existing ones. A high percentage of Pinetop's
receipts are expended for those purposes, and it has maintained separate personnel and equipment to carry out a
variety of tasks relating to road maintenance.
In these circumstances we agree with petitioners that the
federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the
additional burdens sought to be imposed in this case. Respondents seek to apply their motor vehicle hcense and use
fuel taxes on Pinetop for operations that are conducted solely
on Bureau aiH] tribal roads within the reservation. 11 There is
11

In oral ar~~:nmrnt ronnsrl for respondrnt,; apprarrd to eoncrdt• that t,Jl<'
state tnxes could not lawfully lw a~:;erted on tribal mad~ and

a~sertcd

'·
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no room for these taxes in the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. In a variety of ways, the assessment of state
taxes would obstruct federal policies. And equally important,
respondents have been unable to identify any regulatory
function or service performed by the State that would justify
the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal
roads within the reservation.
At the most general level, the taxes would threaten the
overriding federal objecti-ve of guaranteeing Indians that they
will "receive ... the benefit of whatever profit [the forest]
is capable of yielding ...." 25 CFR § 141.3 (a) (3). Underlying the federal regulatory program rests a policy of assuring
that the profits derived from timber sales will inure to the
benefit of the Tribe, subject orily to administrative expenses
incurred by the Federal Government. That objective is part
of the general federal policy of encouraging tribes "to revitalize their self-government" and to assume control over their11business and economic affairs." Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, supra, 411 U. S., at 151. The imposition of the taxes
at issue would undermine that policy in a context in which the
Federal Government has undertaken to regulate the most
minute details of timber production and expressed a finn
desire that the Tribes should retain the benefits derived from
the harvesting and sale of reservation timber.
In addition, the taxes would undermine the Secretary's ability to make the wide range of determinations committed to
his authority concerning the setting of fees and rates with
respect to the harvesting and sale of tribal timber. The Secwa:s unwilling to defend the contrary conclu:sion of the court below, which
made no di~tinction between Bureau and tribal road:; under state and
federal law. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-37. Contrary to reHpondeuto;' position throughout the litigation and in their brief in th1s Court, counsel
limited his argument to a content.ion that the taxe,; could be aH:sertrd on
the road:; of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Ibid. For purpo,;r:; of fedrral
pre-emption, however, WP :;ee no ba.-;i;:;, and re:spondent ~:< pomt to none, for
di:;tinguishing between road:; maintained by the Tribe and -aoad,; ruamtai:ne(t
bQ' the B~1o1:eau of lnd.i;lU Affair~
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retary reviews and approves the terms of the Tribe's agreements with its contractors, sets fees for services rendered to
the tribe by the Federal Government, and determines stumpage rates for timber to be paid to the Tribe. Most notably
in reviewing or writing the terms of the contracts between
FATCO and its contractors, federal agents must predict the
amount and determine the proper allocation of all business
expenses, including fuel costs. The assessment of state taxes
would throw additional factors into the federal calculus,
reducing tribal revenues and diminishing the profitability of
the enterprise for potential contractors.
Finally, the imposition of state taxes would adversely
affect the Tribe's ability to comply with the sustainedyield management policies imposed by federal law. Substantial expenditures are paid out by the Federal Government, the
Tribe, and its contractors in order to undertake a wide variety
of measures to ensure the continued productivity of the forest.
These measures include reforestration , fire control, wildlife
promotion, road improvement, safety inspections, and general
policing of the forest. The expenditures are largely paid for
out of tribal r·evenues, which are in turn derived almost
exclusively from the sale of timber. The imposition of state
taxes on F ATCO's contractors would eft'ectively diminish the
amount of those revenues and thus leave the Tribe and its
contractors with reduced sums with which to pay out federally
required expenses.
As noted above, this is not a case in which the State seeks
to assess taxes in return for governmental functions it performs for those on whom the taxes fall. Nor have respondents
been able to identify a legitimate regulatory interest served
by the taxes it seeks to impose. They refer to a general desire
to raise revenue, but we are unable to discern a responsibility
or service that justifies the assertion of taxes imposed for
on-reservation operations conducted solely on tribal and
Bureau of Indian Affairs roads. Pinetop's business in Arizona
is conducted solely on the Fort Apache Reservation. Though
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at least the use fuel tax purports to "compensat[e] the state
for the use of its highways," Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1552,
no such compensatory purpose is present here. The roads at
issue have been built, main'tained, and policed exclusively by
the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors. We
do not believe that respondents' generalized interest in raising
revenue is in this context sufficient to permit its proposed
intrusion into the federal r·egulatory scheme with respect to
the harvesting and sale of tribal timber.
Respondents' argument is reduced to a claim that they may
assess taxes on non-Indians engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever there is no express congressional statement
to the contrary. That is simply not the law. In a number
of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians
acting on tribal reserva.tions is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject. See
Warren Trading Post, supr.a; Williams v. Lee, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, supra. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical
component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains
highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits. · "'The cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments
over their reservatior)s.' " United States v. M azurie, supra,
419 U. S., at 558, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223
( 1959). Moreover, it is undisputed that the economic burden of the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.1 "

or
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the fart that thr rconomic burdrn of the tax fallx on the
mean that tlw fax i,; pre-empfPd, a~ Moe\'. Salish
& Koote1uri Tribes , 425 U. S. 463 (19i6), maims rle<tl'. Our deci~ion
toda~· ic: ba,;rd on the pn•-Pmptiw rffect of thr romprrhrn~ivP fedrral
regulatory ~chcmr, which, like thn.t. in Warren Tmdi11(1 Post ('o . \'.Arizona
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Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal
timber, where a number of the policies underlying the federal
regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents
seek to impose, and where respondents are unable to justify
the taxes except in terms of a generalizer! interest in raising
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state authority is impermissible.10
Both the reasoning and result in this case follow naturally
from our unanimous decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission, supra. There the State of Arizona
sought to impose a "gross proceeds" tax on a non-Indian company which conducted a retail trading business on the Navajo
Indian Reservation. Referring to the tradition of sovereign
power over the reservation, the Court held that the "comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders" prohibited the
assessment of the attempted taxes. No federal statute by its
terms precluded the assessment of state tax. Nonetheless,
the "detailed regulations," specifying "in the most minute
fashion," id., at 689. the licensing and regulation of Indian
traders, were held "to show that Congress has taken the
business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand
that no room remains for sta.te laws imposing additional burdens upon traders." !d., at 690. The imposition of those
burdens, we held, "could disturb and disarrange the statutory
1 6 Hrspondents al,;o rontPnd thnt. tlw tnxes arr nuthorized by the Buek
Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., and the Ha.ydm-Cartwright Act, 4 U. S. C.
§ 104. ln Warren Tmding Post Co. v. United States, 380 U.S. 685, 691,
n. 18 (1965), we t>quarely held that the Buck Act did not apply to
Indian reservations, and re~pondents pre;;ent no sufficient rea:>on for U8
to depart from that holding. We agree with petitioner::; that the HaydenCartwright Act, which authorizes state taxe:s "on United State;; military
and other reservations," was not det>igned to overcome the otlwrwh;e preemptive effect of federal regulation of tribal timber. We need not reach
the more general question whether the Hayden-Cartwright Act applies to
Indian reservation::; at all.
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plan'' because the economic burden of the state taxes would
eventually be passed on to the Indians themselves. We
referred to the fact that the Tribe had been "largely free to
run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a
policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens
for carrying on those same responsibilities." Ibid. And we
emphasized that "since federal legisla.tion has left the State
with no duties or responsibilities respecting the reservation
Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended to leave to
the State the privilege of levying this tax." /d., at 691. The
present case, we conclude, is in all relevant respects indis"
tinguishable from Warren Trading Post.
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

j)u.prttttt ~ttnrl ttf tqt ~b j)taftsJias-ftingtttn. ~. Qf. 20~~~

)

I

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 21, 1980

RE:

78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker

Dear Thurgood:
I join.

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

<q:~ llf tltt ~tihb ;§taGg
jia:.slrhtgton. ~. <q:. 2ll~j},;l

;§up-umr

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 20, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1177

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely , ~

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

',-

L ·- -"

.

-·-- - . _..._

\
Qf!11ttf ll f iltf ~b .$5~ g
'J,irurfrington, :!E. Qj:. 20.?~~

..§up-r mtt

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

(

June 20, 1980

Re:

I

78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker

Dear John:
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours ,
·,.

( )s,

\.

/

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

:~

.

-

..

'

.....

1·~"'. }fl~J~
~ J~
"' &,

iI ' ~·/
II ...;

I~

~

C)

ctl
lo-1

p:)

.~<t

t~~

II

,.1
~ ~-t ~
-~

.'-}

~

I

~

~

..........

.....

I ~......

c::

~
Q)

-1-1

N

t'\

·~
:3
1"'--1"'---

~

....-l
....-l

~

I

~

CX)

1"'---

l-

t~

1: i-;......

Y\

[fJ

,..
,....

~
>-:

:::;

...;

0
'-'4

::r1

[:-;

II

~~
()

f~

~

'

.

I

~~

~-Z'"'

0..

<

::I

s~:r
~~)
.__

ctl

ctl

;t~

~

Q)

..cC)

-1-1

~*

--:

:>

.S

~ ~

~

i:::

Q)

~

11111

~

~

lo-1

~

'

l p.,"

.-.

.

~~

:..-

......

I

tl

~l
~
h ~

I ~

I

~

~

I

'"---'

~

